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6 February 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Gross

SUBJECT : CCP Information for CIRIS-70 -- What Will be Available to NIRB.

1. This memorandum is to describe the information NIRB can expect to have available from NSA as a result of the agreement in the Ad Hoc Working Group's report, and also to indicate the information NIRB will not be getting concerning cryptologic activity resources.

2. The first point to make clear is that for CIRIS-70 purposes NIRB can obtain whatever information compilations are prepared because they are a part of the detail backing up the formulation of and presentation of the CCP in CY70. Conversely, we will not call for compilations that would have to be hand-done and specially configured just to suit CIRIS-70. (In connection with hand-crafted compilations, however, if NIRB -- in connection with a specific issue study such as a particular NSSM -- requires certain information that is not routinely compiled but can be made available from a record source, NSA will provide this information. The NIRB issue study situation was not a matter which was within our Working Group's terms of reference dealing with the CIRIS-70 data base, and so we did not focus on this point.)

3. What needs to be defined, therefore, is what information can NIRB expect to receive for CIRIS-70 because it is a part of the routine back-up available as a result of preparing for this year's CCP exercise. The answer is as follows:

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(b) Manpower allocation. The NSA data will, I understand, tell us the currently Approved Program as of January 1970 in terms of how many officers, enlisted men, U.S. civilians and foreign civilian manpower are at each station (i.e., positions authorized as of the end of the FY). We will not have actual on board strength, but at its present stage of evolution the CIRIS data base for all programs deal only with authorized and not with actual manpower.

(c) But not the players' dollars. The major limitation in NSA data compilations for CIRIS purposes is that they do not compile dollar costs for each station. At the station level, these data identify the costs of new construction, and what the procurement of new equipment costs. The existing data compilations prepared for the CCP do not tell the costs of Military Pay and Operations & Maintenance at each station.

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(d) Costs are aggregated at the NSA and Service Cryptologic Agency level. Total dollar costs (TOA) are available at the level of the three SCAs and NSA. The total R&D costs, MillPers costs and O&M costs appear at this level. By applying pay factors against authorized station personnel, one could make approximations of the personnel costs at the station level, but probably one could not apportion O&M costs by any general formulas.

(e) Functional activities. For CIRIS-70 it was requested that the Approved Program be function-oriented for one year, FY 71. This means identifying activities such as Collection, Processing, Support, and identifying the sensors used. The other major intelligence programs reporting to CIRIS can provide the dollar costs and the manpower allocated in these ways. The CCP cannot do this for funds, but it can do this for manpower. The NSA available data will give insights into what activities are going on, and where, but in general these cannot be costed with precision in dollar terms. We will not know precisely how much we can derive from the NSA available information until it is in hand to be worked with. It should be valuable in a share of the cases where NIRB is trying to zero in on an issue. There are supplementary data reservoirs that can be related in some cases of issue analysis, such as the information in a USIB committee or background in other files. The NSA information should help to decrease the area of ignorance or uncertainty -- more cannot be said until the materials are worked with.

(f) Target information. For CIRIS-70 it was requested that the Approved Program be target-oriented for one year, FY 71. The other major programs reporting to CIRIS all can do this. NSA available information can do this only in relation to their target list, which is their targeted subelements. NSA cannot do this from available information using the CIRIS target categories. A year or so ago, a study indicated that only 15-20% (roughly) of the total CCP costs could be identified to NSA target subelements. The CIRIS staff can make some correlations between our list of targets and NSA's, but as can be seen, the allocation of dollars to anyone's targets is limited. There is no well-developed and generally accepted methodology at present for allocating indirect costs to targets. As to manpower, NSA can relate all of the CCP manpower to each of their subelements, and by interpretation the CIRIS staff could translate quite a bit of this into the standard CIRIS targets.

(g) Activities within stations. There is probably little that can be done with NSA available information to uniformly describe the character of the principal operating, i.e., mission, activities within each station. This is what was attempted last year with Position information but that caused great objection from NSA. Position information or other activity descriptors in some form will appear in the NSA available data, but I cannot tell how useful this will be until we work with the data.

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4. The foregoing compilations of information will be turned over by NSA to the DCI/NRPE CIRIS staff that is under my direction. Our task then becomes one of analysis of this information. From it we may prepare CIRIS forms to be fed into the computerized data base. Information from the NSA compilations will be extracted and aggregated according to the CIRIS terminology and categories. We will fill in as many of the CIRIS display formats as the data permit.

5. This will be quite an analytical chore, and at present I have no past experience to draw on in quantifying the job. On the other hand, this is, I believe, the first time that these sub-surface levels of program and resource detail have been made available at the community level. It again lies an opportunity as well as a chore, for the best way to understand how to refine and improve a community-wide CIRIS information system for next year is to have first hand experience working directly with the raw materials from each Agency. We have been able to do this over the past two years with the other three big programs, but never until now have we had access to this kind of source material on the system characteristics and complexities in the cryptologic world. So, it can be said that this learning experience is an essential part of the R&D process in system development for CIRIS.

6. Next year it could be a different -- and better -- story. Both Mr. Seidel, the DASD(I) member of the Ad Hoc Working Group, and I were impressed with the breadth and competence shown by the NSA Task Force in taking a fresh look at the entire NSA data system. This was what Admiral Gayler briefly described to NIRB. If Admiral Gayler's Task Force can move ahead fast enough, there could be a whole new ball game next year, because their plans call for providing automatically the kinds of slices and insights which the CIRIS has been seeking, and quite a few more bits and pieces for internal management.

7. Admiral Gayler is undertaking a very considerable task in re-structuring the CCP data system that serves operations and management in NSA and the SCAs. There will be a lot of detail to work out and a sizeable computer programming task. These take time, which is quite short now even though such a system were not to be used until next year. The system needs to be brought to a final form by the middle of 1970, since its implementation should be in time for the CY71 programming guidance that generally is issued in mid-fall of each year.

8. These broad-gauged new plans, with which I generally agree, could well be whittled down by delays or challenges of one form or another. Anything that can be done to assist Admiral Gayler's Task Force would be well-deserved; these people are experienced and objective and they will need continued support at the top levels.



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Office of the Director of Central Intelligence
and
Chairman, CIRIS Committee Ad Hoc Working Group

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